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THE "PERMEATION" ISSUE
IN FEDERAL AID
TO EDUCATION
George E. Reed*

M

which recognizes that the child
citizen may subscribe to any religious creed, proscribe him from
general educational benefits if his state-approved course of instruction
is associated with religion? This is rapidly becoming the critical constitutional question in connection with Federal Aid legislation.
It is no secret that education in Catholic parochial and private schools
adheres to an educational philosophy which requires that the curriculum
be integrated with relevant religious concepts. This is not to say that
the Catholic concept of education demands that extraneous religious concepts and examples be introduced into the teaching of the basic humanistic disciplines. It means rather that when the conclusions of a physical
or social science course impinge on theological premises there must be a
full explanation of the principle so that a harmonious and valid picture
will be presented to the student. This concept of the integration of religious principles applies to the whole curriculum. It varies in its emphasis depending on the nature of the subject, the teacher or text book.
There is nothing new or alien about this approach to education. In
1787 our Founding Fathers incorporated the following provision in the
Northwest Ordinance:
UST THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,

Article III: Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government
and the happiness of mankind, schools and
the means of education shall be forever encouraged.
This same language was incorporated in the Southwest Ordinance
which was adopted in 1789 by the same Congress that formulated the
first amendment. The Catholic philosophy of education obviously has
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distinguished historical and constitutional
associations. But now the argument is being
advanced that this very philosophy of education precludes the federal government
from extending financial assistance.
The "No Aid" Theory
In a recent research project supported
by the National Council of Churches,' it
was stated that the textbooks in parochial
schools adhere to this philosophy and that
even the physical science courses reflect it.
On the basis of these findings it was
asserted that the portion of the National
Defense Education Act, which provides
loans for private schools for the acquisition
of textbooks in the physical sciences and
foreign languages is unconstitutional; presumably on a guilt by association theory.
Clothed in constitutional language, the
argument is advanced that because of this
association the receipt of public money
constitutes aid to religion and therefore
violates the no establishment clause of the
first amendment. Strong reliance is placed
on the "no aid to religion" doctrine of
Everson v. Board of Educ. There the Court
stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of
the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
or
which aid one religion, aid all religions,
2
prefer one religion over another.
The "no aid" theory, frequently read
and applied in an uncritical manner since
it was first enunciated by Mr. Justice Black,
has led to many broad doctrinaire statements and positions inaccurately implying
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a prohibition of any form of economic
assistance to an institution whose curriculum is integrated with religious percepts.
This question was before the Court in
Everson. For example, in oral argument,
the attorney for appellant advanced the
following proposition:
So paying the transportation cost did more
than aid the child in pursuing his secular
education, it put him in the one place where
religious instruction was made available. ...
Church school has two functions; the teaching of secular subjects and the teaching of
religion. 4
Later in the oral argument, the point came
up most forcefully in a colloquy between
Mr. Justice Black and the attorney for the
appellee. Mr. Justice Black stated:
I could understand it [your argument] if
you based [it on] the situation, which it
seems to me exists, that it does help religious schools but . . . it helps because of
public education, and we shouldn't hold
that it offends the broad purpose of the
First Amendment.'
The decision of the Court upholding the
transportation law reflects this colloquy.
It held that the transportation legislation
satisfied a public purpose, and then, after
reciting the "no aid" language, declared
that:
[O]ther language of the First Amendment
commands that New Jersey cannot hamper
its citizens in the free exercise of their own
religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude
.. . Catholics, Lutherans . . . or the members of any other faith, because of their
faith or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.;
It is obvious from this holding that the
"no aid" doctrine may not be read in a
3 Record, p. 16.

'LaNoue,

The National Defense Education Act
and "Secular" Subjects, 43 PHi DELTA KAPPAN
380 (June 1962).
2 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1946).

4 Id. at 21.

5 Id. at 50.
Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 2, at
16.
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dogmatically literal manner and may not
be applied without adverting to the fact
that it is a legal term that calls for the
application of the doctrine in the light of
relevant judicial norms. What are these
norms? First, Everson teaches us that the
state must be neutral and that the "no aid"
principle is conditioned by this judicial
mandate of neutrality.' This doctrine was
given positive emphasis in the case of
Zorach v. Clauson, where the Supreme
Court, in upholding a New York released
time statute, declared:
We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being. .

.

. When

the State encourages religious instruction
or cooperates with religious authorities...
it follows the best of our traditions. For
it then respects the religious nature of our
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.'
The neutrality norm of Everson was thus
freed of its negative characteristics and became a dynamic principle deviating sharply
from the secularistic philosophy of McCollum v. Board of Educ. 9 Itmust now be interpreted in light of the accommodation
mandate of Zorach and the juridical philosophy underlying it-a philosophy which
is predicated on cooperation between
Church and State.
Public Purpose
Secondly, Everson indicates (though in
a generalized manner), the essential relationship of the public purpose character of
the legislation to the ultimate solution of
the issue. With respect to this norm, the
Court observed in Everson that:
'National

Catholic Welfare Conference, The

Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church Related Schools in Federal Aid to Education, 50
GEO.L.J. 399 (1961).
8 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
9333 U.S. 203 (1948).

It is much too late to argue that legislation
intended to facilitate the opportunity of
children to get a secular education serves
no public purpose1°

In so holding it cited the case of Cochran v. Board of Educ.,11 where the Court had
sustained the constitutionality of a statute
which provided for the use of textbooks by
all of the school children in the State of
Louisiana. In this key case the Court declared:
Viewing the statute as having the effect thus
attributed to it, we can not doubt that the
taxing power of the State is exerted for a
public purpose. The legislation does not
segregate private schools, or their pupils,
as its beneficiaries or attempt to interfere
with any matters of exclusively private concern. Its interest is education, broadly, its
method, comprehensive. Individual interests are aided only
as the common interest
2
is safeguarded.
Admittedly, the public purpose concept
of Cochran and Everson has not been used
adequately as a norm for interpreting the
"no aid" doctrine, probably because
the
Court did not in the Everson decision attempt to spell out the relationship between
this concept and "no establishment." The
position that the religious instruction in a
parochial school is a disqualifying factor
is a perfect example of the confusion which
has resulted from the "wall of separation"
which has been erected between the public purpose principle of the fourteenth
amendment and the "no establishment"
clause of the first amendment. Little effort
has been made to relate and harmonize
the first and fourteenth amendments. Concededly, aid to education serves a public
purpose under the fourteenth amendment."
18

Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 2, at 7.

tA 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
'' Id. at 375.
13 Cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
(1946).

1
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Ordinarily this would conclude a controversy over the constitutionality of public
aid. The question is now asked, "Even if
a public purpose is served, is there aid to
the sectarian institution?" If the question
is answered in the affirmative, then the
tendency is to conclude that there is a violation of the first amendment.
This compartmentalized approach to
problems affected by the first and fourteenth amendments results from the disposition to regard the "no aid" concept of
the first amendment as an absolute. A critical and informative analysis of the validity of this attitude may be found in the
June 16, 1962 issue of America. In an
article entitled, "Textbooks and the Constitution," Charles M. Whelan, S.J.. makes
th , following comment:
If the Supreme Court has made anything
clear since the New Deal, it is that there
are no absolutes in our constitutional law.
This may be regrettable, but it is a fact.
It is one of the principal reasons why we
have so many split and prolix opinions.
Actually, the doctrine is not as relativistic
as it sounds. The point driven home in one
decision after another is that the "no" language in the Bill of Rights means not
"never", but "hardly ever". "The First
Amendment", wrote Mr. Justice Douglas
for the court in the Zorach decision (1952),
"within the scope of its coverage permits
no exception; the prohibition is absolute.
The First Amendment, however, does not
say that in every and all respects there
shall be a separation of Church and State.' 4
The Relationship Between
"No Aid" and Public Purpose
With this proposition in mind we may
now proceed to examine the interrelationship between the first and fourteenth
amendments. At the outset we are 'con'4

America, June 16, 1962, p. 400.
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fronted with the fact that the very application of the principles of the first eight
amendments to the state is through the
medium of the fourteenth amendment.
Moreover, the concept of liberty now frequently associated with the first amendment was first articulated in connection
with the liberty clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 1 5 In short, we do not have two
basically different and unrelated principles.
The public purpose concept has a definite
relationship to the concept of aid. Mr. Justice Rutledge saw this quite clearly in his
dissenting opinion in Everson. There, he
stated:
We have here then one substantial issue,
not two. To say that New Jersey's appropriation and her use of the power of taxation for raising the funds appropriated are
not for public purposes but are for private
ends, is to say that they are for the support
of religion and religious teaching. Conversely, to say that they are for public purposes is to say that they are not for religious ones ...
Now it [the Court] declares in effect that
the appropriation of funds to defray part
of the cost of attending these schools is for
a public purpose. If so, I do not understand why the state cannot go farther or
why this case approaches the verge of its
power.:'
It is therefore submitted that if educational
legislation satisfies a public purpose, then
any "aid to religion" must be substantial
and directly intended before it may be held
15 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

See also Hamilton v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 263 U.S. 245
(1934); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940). In the latter case the Supreme Court
declared: "The fundamental concept of liberty
involved in . . . [the Fourteenth] Amendment
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment." Id. at 303.
16 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 51
(1946).
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to be constitutionally suspect. A corollary
of this proposition is that legislation which
satisfied a public purpose under the fourteenth amendment creates a prima facie
case of "no aid" under the first amendment.
This principal would give the legislative
function the dignity to which it is entitled.
The legislature would then have reasonable
assurance that when it passes a law which
satisfies a public purpose, it will not be
struck down on the basis of a doctrinaire
thesis deriving from an absolute interpretation of the "no aid" principle of the first
amendment. Moreover, the fourteenth
amendment would be restored to its rightful place in the judicial process. This prime
facie case would be materially strengthened
if the public purpose coincided with the
implementation of rights guaranteed under
the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Thus, in addition to the neutrality
norm of Everson and Zorach, we have the
presumption of "no aid" deriving from
legislation which satisfies a public purpose
-a
presumption which is strengthened
when the law implements the constitutional
guarantee of religious liberty.
The Supreme Court has moved forward
in this direction in the Sunday Law cases. 7
In upholding the legislation it acknowledged that there would be some collateral
and unavoidable benefits to religion but
not aid in an unconstitutional sense, for
a public purpose was being satisfied' 8 - a
purpose contemplated by the legislature-

namely the setting aside of a day for rest
or leisure. A secular end was intended and
achieved. Thus the argument of aid to
religion, amounting to establishment, was
rejected. Here is an excellent example of
the necessity for giving full consideration
to the public purpose of the statute in determining whether there is unconstitutional
aid. These cases build an important constitutional bridge between the first and
fourteenth amendments. They are an extension and refinement of the Everson case.
The Public School
Prayer Case
The latest decision of the Supreme Court
involving the establishment clause is that
of Engel v. Vitale. 9 In this case the Court
declared that the following prayer, formulated by the New York Board of Regents
violated the first amendment:
Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy
blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers
and our country.
This prayer was recited in some of the
public schools of New York on the recommendation of the State Board of Regents.
The various school boards were free to
adopt or reject it. If adopted, no child was
required to recite the prayer or remain in
the room where it was recited. In holding
that the prayer violated the establishment
of religion clause of the first amendment,
the Court declared: "li]t is no part of the
business of government to compose official

17 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);

Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v.
McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Mkt., Inc., 366 U.S. 617
(1961).
18 "However, it is equally true that the 'Establishment' Clause does not ban federal or state
regulation of conduct whose reason or effect

merely happens to coincide or harmonize with
the tenets of some or all religions. In many instances, the Congress or state legislatures conclude that the general welfare of society, wholly
apart from any religious considerations, demands such regulation." McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961).
1, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1962, p. 16, col. 1.
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prayers for any group of the American
people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government."
An interesting aspect of this case is that
no mention was made of any of the other
church-state cases decided by the Court.
Nor was any reliance placed upon the "no
aid" theory. This is especially significant in
light of the concuring opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas who asserted: "The point for decision is whether the Government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise.20
In support of this plea for a broad ruling,
he asserted that: "Our system at the Federal and state levels is presently honey'combed with such financing."'
He cited the following of "aids to religion": the G.I. Bill of 1944, the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946,
bible reading in public schools, tax exemption of religious organizations, and the
Pledge of Allegiance. He indicated that
the problem today would be uncomplicated
but for the Everson case and then asserted
that this case is "out of line with the First
Amendment." Significantly no other member of the Court adopted his view. He
stands alone in this extreme application of
the "no aid" theory. On the contrary, the
Court stated:
There is of course nothing in the decision
reached here that is inconsistent with the
fact that school children and others are
officially encouraged to express love for our
country by reciting historical documents
such as the Declaration of Independence
which contain references to the Deity or
by singing officially espoused anthems which
include the composer's professions of faith
in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that
there are many manifestations in our public
life of belief in God. Such patriotic or
ceremonial occasions bear no true resem20

21

Id. at col. 3.
Ibid.
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blance to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this instance.22
Here is the suggestion that the satisfaction of a public purpose, "the expression
of love for one's country" is the determining factor which operates to uphold a practice involving a profession of faith in a
Supreme Being. No such argument was
present in the Engel case and admittedly
it would have been difficult to introduce.
However, it is obvious that Court is demonstrating a real interest in the element of
a public purpose.
Just as the preoccupation with the establishment clause of the first amendment
leads many to ignore the implications of
the finding of a public purpose under the
fourteenth amendment so it also induces
advocates of absolute separation to ignore
the relevance of the free exercise clause
of the first amendment. The first amendment must be given a unitary construction
with the viewpoint of securing religious
liberty.23 In summary, the "no aid to religion" doctrine must be applied within
the limitations of the neutrality mandate,
must not ignore the fourteenth amendment
implication of the finding of a public purpose, and must respect the relevance of
the free exercise clause.
Let us apply these legal norms to the
proposition that the religious content of
parochial school textbooks and curriculum
precludes participation in the National Defense Education Act.
Initially the proponent of this view must
concede that the parochial school provides
a curriculum that complies with the state
requirements. This is a fact and a fact
with real legal significance. It thus satisfies
22
23

Id. at col. 3.
McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 18.
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a public purpose and imposes a burden on
the opponent to demonstrate that any collateral benefit to religion amounts to establishment. The only way that this could be
accomplished would be to prove that the
legislature had enacted a law for the purpose of substantially benefitting religion.
Certainly this was not true of the N.D.E.A.
legislation. Congress, concerned by Sputnik, legislated for the purpose of developing more scientists in the schools of the
nation. Its interests was a national one and
this interest could not be properly served
by taking a position that the scientific
potential of the children in church-related
schools should be ignored because their
scientific studies were part of a curriculum
which had some religions overtones. To
have done so would have impaired the full
achievement of the public purpose of the
legislation and would have involved an
action of hostility toward religion. The
Government would have ignored its need
because of the children's creed. 24 The Constitution does not ask this much.
It is fortunate that the LaNoue study
challenges the N.D.E.A. legislation for it
brings into focus the national implications
of a constitutional position which ignores
the basic norms of interpreting the "no
establishment" clause of the first amendment. If Congress had not taken a neutral
attitude, if it had not recognized the constitutional implications of the public purpose character of the legislation, the nation
would have been deprived of the potential
of fifteen per cent of the nation's students.
Such a result would be limited not merely
to N.D.E.A. but to the whole realm of
federal aid to education if all qualified
schools were not included, including churchCf. Chance v. Mississippi, 190 Miss. 435, 200
So. 706 (1941).

24

related schools.
Current Influence of the
Blaine Amendment
Reference is made specifically to federal
legislation because we are confronted with
a constitutional problem that derives from
federal law. This point cannot be emphasized too strongly for there is a growing
tendency to interpret the first amendment
on the basis of attitudes deriving from state
constitutions. This is confusing to say the
least, for the provisions of state constitutions concerning the relationship between
Church and State have a different judicial
and historical background than the first
amendment. Most of the state constitutions are directly or indirectly related to
the so-called Blaine Amendment which
came close to adoption in 187625 at a time
when there was open anti-Catholic sentiment. This proposed amendment which
narrowly failed to secure a two-thirds majority, read as follows:
No State shall make any law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; and no religious
test shall ever be required as a qualification
to any office or public trust under any State.
No public property, and no public revenue
of, nor any loan of credit by or under the
authority of, the United States, or any
State, Territory, District or municipal corporation, shall be appropriated to, or made
or used for, the support of any school, education or other institution, under the control of any religious or antireligious sect,
organization, or denomination, or wherein
the particular creed or tenets of any religious or antireligious sect, organization, or
denomination shall be taught; and no such
appropriation or loan of credit shall be
A similar amendment has been rejected on
twenty occasions subsequent to 1876. H.R. Doc.
No. 551, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1928).
25
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made to any religious or antireligious sect,
organization or denomination, or to promote its interests or tenets. This article
shall not be construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution;
and it shall not have the effect to impair
rights of property already vested. Congress
shall have power, by appropriate legislation,
to provide for the prevention and
punish26
ment of violations of this article.
Though defeated, its basic tenets and philosophy were incorporated into many state
constitutions. In these jurisdictions problems arising of a church-state nature are
solved by an application of the precise
terms of the law deriving from the Blaine
proposal.2 7 No reference is made to the
public purpose of the legislation. A casual
examination of the Blaine Amendment indicates quite clearly that it makes no room
for this basic concept. The first amendment, on the other hand does not preclude
the application of the public purpose principle. For example, the Supreme Court
held in Bradfield v. Roberts, 28 that a direct
appropriation might be made, for the performance of a public function, to an institution conducted under the auspices of a
church which exercised "perhaps controlling influence" over it. Moreover, the
Court directly disavowed the argument that

religious institutions performing a public
function cannot, because of the first amendment, be assisted by government. Actually,
one of the most fundamental propositions
in federal law is that the coincidence of
private interest with national welfare does
not defeat the legislation. This point was
emphasized strongly in Everson:
Nor does it follow that a law has a private
rather than a public purpose because it provides that tax-raised funds will be paid to
reimburse individuals on account of money
spent by them in a way which furthers a
public program. .

. Subsidies and loans

to individuals such as farmers and homeowners, and to privately owned transportation systems, as well as many other kinds
of businesses, have been commonplace 2prac9
tices in our state and national history.
Likewise, Judge Cooley in his work on
Taxation wrote:
To justify the court in declaring the tax
void, the absence of all possible public interest in the purpose for which the funds
are raised must be clear and palpable-so
clear and palpable as to be perceivable by
every mind at first blush.8"
This is a rational principle necessary to
the proper function of the legislative process and at the very heart of progressive
social legislation.
Conclusion

26 4 CONG. REC.

5595 (1876).

An example of this approach may be found
in a recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court holding that a law providing transportation to all school children from points on regular school routes to the nearest public school
was unconstitutional. The decision was based on
a provision of the constitution which embodied
the Blaine approach. The court declared that its
constitution was broader in its reach than the
first amendment and that it prevented any aid
to parochial schools, even transportaion to the
nearest public school. Everson, following the
public purpose norm, reached the opposite conclusion.
27

28

175 U.S. 291 (1899).

Since the community has such an important interest in these areas a solution
must be found to the church-state issue.
Progress will be made if we resort to basic
legal principles unaffected by irrelevant criteria such as the application of the Blaine
tenets to the interpretation of the federal
constitution. Of equal importance is the
9 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 7
(1946).
80 As quoted with approval in Scott v. Frazier,
258 Fed. 669 (D.C.N.D. 1919), rev'd on other
grounds, 253 U.S. 243 (1920).
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necessity for harmonizing the empowering
aspect of the public purpose principle with
the limiting aspect of the first amendment.
The nature of the legislation can ease
the solution of this problem. For example,
most of the federal aid programs do not
provide for the full cost of the project.
Loans must be repaid with interest and
grants are generally on a fifty-fifty matching basis. Therefore, it is fair to assume
that the public money does no more than
pay for the secular aspect of the instruction. The neutrality norm would preclude
the application of an argument based on
the disqualifying factor of religion.
Another legislative approach that minimizes the church-state problem is legislation which gives the same things to all
schools for educational purposes. An excellent example of this type of legislation
is embodied in the Surplus Property Act
which makes real the personal property
available to all qualified institutions on a
donation basis. Similarly, the N.D.E.A.
makes the same equipment available to
private schools as to public schools for the
same purpose but on a different financial
basis. St. John's parochial school could only
secure a government loan for the purchase
of a microscope, whereas, the public school
could secure a fifty per cent grant for the
procurement of the same item. Legislation
was given serious consideration during the
first session of the Congress which would
have placed all schools in substantially the
same position insofar as the N.D.E.A. is
concerned. 31
These legislative techniques together
3i For a more complete discussion of legislative
approaches, see National Catholic Welfare Conference, The Constitutionality of the Inclusion
of Church Related Schools in Federal Aid to
Education, 50 GEO. L.J. 399, 435-36 (1961).

with the principles set forth above will
work to the benefit of the national community if they are applied as federal norms
of construction divorced from the irrelevant
philosophy of the various state constitutions. The tendency of congressmen to
reflect the constitutional philosophy of
their state in their approach to legislation is
understandable but it only confuses and obscures the federal constitutional issue. For
example, most state constitutions specifically prohibit grants or donations to religious
institutions. It is therefore frequently assumed that grants and donations are per se,
bad. There is no such doctrine under the
federal constitution, if the grant is made to
achieve a public purpose.3 2 It would be
otherwise if the grant were made to assist
religion but we are not addressing these
remarks to such legislation.
Progress may not be expected, unless the
problem is approached in a scholarly manner with a view toward furthering the national interest. Frankly, I find it difficult
to believe that this national issue will be
resolved by studies which are predicated
on the proposition that the slightest benefit
to religion is a disqualifying factor for such
a principle is at war with generating and
sustaining principles of this country.
32

Congressional

action

discloses

a

series of

grants and donations to religious bodies. Among
them are the following: National Defense Education Act, 72 Stat. 1583, 20 U.S.C. § 421
(1958); National School Lunch Act, 60 Stat.
230 (1946), 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (1958); College
Housing Amendments of 1955, 69 Stat. 644
(1955), 12 U.S.C. § 1749 (1958); and the fol-

lowing provisions of the Public Health Service
Act: Construction of Hospitals and Other Medical Facilities, 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 291 (1958); Construction of Health
Research Facilities, 70 Stat. 717 (1956), 42
U.S.C. § 292 (1958); Training of Nurses or
Supervisors, 70 Stat. 924 (1956), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 242e (Supp. Il1 1959-61).

